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At  a  moment  when  the  ~uropean  Comrr.~:-.i ty  ha.s  been  visibly marldng  time  for 
several years  - years  of severe  eco:1omic  difficulty for its member  States, 
it must  be  said - it is  U:lcierGta:ld~b:e  and  riGht  that  those  concerned with 
the life of this Community  should be  turning  their minds  to  the  question of 
how  it can  re-acquire  the  momentum  necessary  to carry it forward  towards  the 
objectives of its founders.  This  has  been  the  theme  of  many  speeches  in  the 
last couple  of  y~ars and  I  cannot  promise  to add  much  to  this continuing 
debate.  It seemed  to  me,  however,  that it might be  worthwhile at this 
point  in  time  .to  look back at  the  Rome  Treaty  in  the  lir,ht of hindsight, 
with a  view  to  identifyin~ its  str~ngths and  weaknesses,  for it is within  the 
framework of this Treaty with all its merits and  defects,  that progress has 
to be  envisaeed - even  proeress  involving an  amendment  to  the Treaty itself. 
Those  who  drafted  this  document  20 years  ago  showed·remarkable  judgment aa 
to  the  obstacles  to  be  ovcrc0me  iu  ~oving towards  economic  and  political 
inter;ra  tion  of  the  member  .St"i. ten  and  remurkable  foresight  u.s  to  the  kind of 
structure that coulci  be  establisheJ which  would  hnve  wfthin  itself the 
leverage  necessary  to secure  co:1tinuine progress  towards  that goal  over a 
period of many  years,  and  in  the  fnce  of inevitable obstacles.  It wns  this 
judgment and  this fonsir;ht  t1-.at  cave  to  the  Community  the  momentum  that 
carried it through  the  first  15  years  of  its existence and  that gave  it the 
strength  to survive,  with minimal  dama~c  to its fabric,  n  recession whose 
origins and  whose  mar;nitude  were  certainly not  conceivable  to politicians 
and  planners  two  decadc.s  ar;o. 
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Those  who  drafted  the  l~ome Treaty  had  learned much  from  the  experience  of  the 
previous seven years,  which  had  seen  the  failure  of  the  Council of  Europe  to 
develop along the  lines many  of its founders  had  expected,  and  had  seen  the 
l.uropean Defence  Community  initia  ti  vc  dissolve  in  the  fnce  of opposition  in 
certain member  £ltates.  From  the~w events  they  drew  the  conclusion  that progress 
towards  political integration required as  a  condition precedent a  solid basis 
of economic  integration.  They  planned accordingly,  and  to this we  o\ie  the 
extreme  concentration of  the  Rome  Treaty  on  economic  matters and its virtual 
silence on  political aspects  of  European  integration. 
They  were  right in startinf with  the  idea of a  customs  union,  not confined 
simply  to  the  freeing of  trade  and  the  establishment of a  common  external 
tariff,  but also  incorporatin~ strinGent provisions  designed  to secure  the 
elimination of non-tariff barriers  to  trade,  whether  these  took  the  form  of 
cartels,  monopolies,  State aid,  or obstacles  to  the  free  movement  of  the 
factors  of  prouu~ticn.  They  were  right also in  their conviction  that,  given 
the existence of managed  ar,ricultural markets  in each of  the  individual 
member  countries,  the  establishment of such a  customs  union  must  be  accompanied 
by  the establishment of a  Common  Agricultural  Policy~~~?ed on  a  single price 
"'"':;  -
structure,  with necessary  price supports,  and  free  movement  of  farm  products 
within  the  area of  the  proposed  Community.  They  calculated  that if such  a 
customs  union  and  single agricultural  market  could be  established  that  the 
benefits  to  the  participants  in  ter:ns  of  wideninr; of their home  markets  many 
times  over would  make  tl::.is  mensure  of  economic  integration irreversible. 
Where  it was  not possible at  th:1 t  tir.lt:  to  foresee  in detail -L.~ development 
of economic  integration,  they  had  be wisdom  to  devise  the principle of an 
I 
\ ( 
j 
I 
I 
i 
I 
3 -
agreement  to agree  by  a  fixed  deo.dline  - a  system which  has  proved itself 
over and over aGain  in  the  history of  the  development of  the Community 
albeit with some,  usually  minor,  time  modifications,  that have  involved 
'stopping  the  clock'  at critical moments. 
The  institutional structure which  they  invented also contained a  number  of 
elements  which  have  proved of crucial  importance  in maintaining  throughout 
so much  of  the  following  two  decades  the  momentum  of  the  development  of  the 
Community.  They  guessed  that  the  enthusiasm of governments for economic  and 
political integration, although it might  be sufficiently strong in  the  mid-
1950s  to persuade six governments  to sign the  Rome  Treaty,  might wane  in  the 
years  that followed,  and  that  to  leave  the  initiative in respect of  the many 
detailed developments  that would  have  to  take  place during  the  period of 
evolution of  the  Community  exclusively  to member  governments subjected  to 
domestic  pressures would  be  dangerous  and possibly fatal.  It was  this 
insight  that led to  the  development  of  the  concept of a  European  Commission, 
independent oi ,  .. ~,,Jber covernmcnts  and  having an exclusive  poh"a~  :.:  ir.i tia ti  ve 
subject only  to  the  richt of nember  governments  to  request  the  Commission  to 
study matters considered der;irable  for  the  attainment of common  objectives and 
make  proposals  on  them. 
They  saw,  too,  that while at  that  time it would  be  impossible  to get agreement 
on  a  directly elected European Parliament with full legislative powers  and 
control over decisions  of  the  1xecutive,  nevertheless if they  could get a 
Consultative  Assembly  established,  consistin~ of politicians from  member 
countries~  this  ARJ::~>rohly  of-politicians--would  in  time start to insist both on 
the  importance  of  deriving its mandate  directly from  the  peoples of Europe - lt  - I 
I 
and also on  the.importance  of  gainin~ the  kind  of  powers  that any self-
I  \ 
respecting  Par~iament in  the  20th  century must  certainly have. 
Finally,  on  the  institutional side,  they  saw  the  danger  that national Courts 
might  interpret this Treaty  in different ways  and  they  met  this by  giving to 
the Court of Justice  of  the  LUropean  Community  the  final  power  of interpretation 
of  the  Treaty,  a  power  which  could  bind  national governments. 
All  this was  well  conceived,  well  planned  and  well  executed.  Inevitably, 
however,  the structure  thus  established had  weaknesses  that could not  then.be 
foreseen,  or which,  even  if foreseen at that  time,  could not be  remedied  given 
the state of public  opinion  in  the  member  countrie,s  whooe  ~overnmento were  to 
be  asked  to sign  this Treaty of  economic  integration.  It is worth\ihile, 
perhaps,  to list some  of  these  weaknesses,  because it is  these deficiencies 
that  have  contributed,  in very difficult econoffiic  circumstances,  it is true, 
to  the  6lowing-downof  the  momentum  of  the  Community  and  to  growing doubts 
as  to its continuing  int~rnal dynamism.  It is  these  deficiencies  th&t  ~"Jt be 
overcome  if this  loss of  momentum  is  to  prove  temporary  and  is not  to become 
a  permanent source  of weakness. 
First of all, although  the  provisior.s  for  economic  integration in  the  Rome 
Treaty  were  well-judged as  conditions  pr~cedent to  the  development  of a 
Community  that  wpuld  be  fully  integrated both economically  and  politically, 
they  were  not  of  themselves sufficiently  fundamental  in  their impact  in member 
countries  to ensure  that complete  economic  integration would  be  achieved. 
The  Treaty  is notably  weak  i~  the. ~ection on  e-co.nomic  policy.  Save  in 
relation to  comm~rcial policy,  this section is lareely confined  to meaaurce w) th  J'eGard  to  the  cur.t\II:J.s  union,  v:hile  n1~n·.::tllj:  zmffic:ii'IIL  flexibil) ty  for 
'rhorc  io  a  notal&)e  ab.se:ncc  of  the  hinrl  of  provisionn  with 
rc:>npec t  to  th1!  coordination  of  cconor::ic  polic iu;  in  m1·mhc•r  coun trier;  that  would 
be  necesnary if fuJ 1  econor.-.ic  in  tcgrn lion were  to  be  achif''/(~u  and  there  is an 
nbscncc  of adequate  provir;ionn  Hith  re:>pt:ct  to  n.onL"tary  policy.  Similarly 
Hi th  respcc t  to  the ·prohlcna  of  harmoni.sin£:  di  verr,eracec  in  the  s tar,o  of  economic 
developu.en t  achieved  in member  countries  nnd  dc:41 inr,  with  tlHl  very diffcrcn  t 
kindn  of  regional problems  that exist within member  coun trios,  the  Trcr~  ty  is 
clearly deficient.  Indeed  regional  poljcy ltppcnrs  only  us  a  possible exception 
to  a  compoti tion policy  det;ir,ned  to  secure  ttc  removal  of  inequalities  in 
reapoct of  the  proviaion  of State aid for  induotrinl development. 
Another deficiency  on  the  economic  policy  side  woG  tl1e  implied uasumption  that 
G<'crno  to  run  throur;h  the  Treaty,  t..h<~t  c:-:clHanre  rate stability could  be  readily 
maintained  b9h1 o~>n .mc~bcr countric.>  nnd  that  in  oomc .undefined  way  the  process 
of  t.he  estnbliahrnent  of  the  cuctor;,;;  union  and  tho  elimination of  the  non-tariff 
b<Hricrs  to  trnde,  would  ensure  uniformity  in  infla lion  ra  toR  and  the  mn in tennnce 
of  currency puritiea.  Curiously  enough,  this  implied  uscumption  which  lo  us 
·~~- -
toJny  seemG  so  extraordinary,  appeared  during  the  firo  t  doc<Hfc  of  the  existence 
of  the  Corr.muni ty  to  be  val  ida  ted  by  actual  experience  1  for  during  this  poriod 
th0re  were  virtually no  exchange  ru tc  chanr;cG  of  oignifica11Ce  as  between  member 
.S tn leG. 
This  assumption  of  monc t<n·y  s tubili  ty  \v:i thir.  the  Community  underlay  in  particular 
the  concept of a  common  price system  for r.q;ricul tural producto  wi~  .. ~n  the ( 
I 
t~UUI'i.>.ntecrl  'L:~causo  t:J,e  Comr;1on  Ac_:l·icuJ turiJJ.  PoJ.ic:y 1  ,,·b:icl1  11as  of  slich 
u  cur:i.ous  invcrr.i on  Clf  cconor.lic  lor;i c. 
TLcrc  we1·e  nlno  dcficiei"1Cicn  in  the  in.stituti.onn1  r,i:.ructUl'C  thnt had  been  r.o 
I 
:  I  carefully plnnnou  by  the  foundcn·s  Gf  tho  Community.  11hi1c  the  concept of  nn 
iJvlopcr~tlcnt  Corr.rnir..s::ion  Hith  nn  m:cJ.1wivo  J•O'.-:tll'  of initiative provt·d  extremely 
vnlnab1e  dur·in1;  the  fir:::t  dccucie  or .so  of  t}w  life of  tbe  Community,  there  \-/a£> 
an  inherent  <lefcct  in  thit:  arranr;or:icnt  - tho  fnct  that  tlw  members  of  the 
Commir;~ion o.re  appointed  in  cornrr,on  r  ... ccord by  mcr~hor r;ovcrnmcnts  Hhich,  r,:i ven 
the  natural dt!n:irc  of  each  member  r,ovornmcmt  to  control  the  appointment  of its 
m-m  nominee, or  nonrineen,  proved unduly  prone  to  become  nn  exerciBo  in mutual 
hncl,·t>erutchinc- each  country  cnrefully ·n)fraining  from  interferinG with  its 
I  ,. 
partneru1  choices  in  tl1e· hopes  of  bcir:r;  le:ft  completely  f1·cc  to  choor.e  i tr.  o1m 
Comr;1insioncrs.  The  absence  of any role  for  i.ho  Assembly in  the  appointment  of 
the  Commission,  and  t.he  limitation of  the  /\sf>mnbly's  Power  of control over  the 
Commission  to  a  power  of dismissal  of  the  v!l101t!  Comfl\Jssion,  unl:i kely in 
;.,;._·  ' 
practice evor  to be utilised,  h:.1s  left member  r:overnmcnts  with an excessive 
degree  of  individual  control over  their own  r~ppointrnenrs,  This  was,  perhaps, 
bound  over  a  period  of time  to  WC<iken  the  Commission's  sense  of  independence, 
and  its ability to exorcise  i tn  power  of  initiative~ v:i thout rcg:ud  to  nntionc.l 
political considerations. 
One  may  hope  that  the  recent decision  to  nnrninai.c~  tho  ProGiderit  of The 
Comnli sn ion  in advance  of oth0r mem1JcJ.'S,  a~;  prO]Josed  by  rny  Prime Minister last 
Novmnber  and  to concede  to  him  a  consultative  l.'olc  in 1:elation to  tho  choice J;is  collca{D.ws,  w:L 11  in  some  mc<wm·o  ~li tir;ate thb  dr:fr~d. 
The  futmtic:rs  of  tho  Con;r;,;tni.i:y  \'Jcro  nlno  ovr!r-oplinLi.r~tic in  c~xpncting that the 
Co~cult~tive As8cmbly would  nssc:rt  itself within  a  relatively short  time 
dcnm.nded,  Hith  r.nffid.C'nt  v:i1;our  to  Cll5\ll'e  ::;ucc<!i>~~,  an  effective  role  in 
Gorwnni ty hndr;et.-making  and  it haD  iv.lwn  aluw~>t :?O  yc•.rtrn  fol'  tlirect elections 
to  bf!cor~lo  a  real  i:wuc.  ·  EvL~n  today  1  b10  dccaci..:;n  aftt:r  the  founcla iion  of  tho 
Conl!nlmit:r,  the  que:otion  of  ler,i.slat:Lve  po•wrc  h<w  still to  como  under 
'l'hL'l't~  nrc!  finully  t;ovcrnl  other more  r;cnoral  cr:i tic:icrns  that mir;ht  he  mude 
of  t.hc ·r.rrcn ty.  Firat,  the  emphaDis  on  hnrmonication  of  pol:icio.s  with  n  view 
to  olir:Jiuutinr; non··tariff  br~rricr.s  to· tr<~do  nnd  to  cnsur·ilJG  a  con,mon  basis  for 
U1o  rnisinr; of  'own  rcoourcun'  wan  perhaps  bxcccsive 1  conjurin~ up  a  picture of 
a  future  Communily  more  uniform  in certain  rcopectG  even  thnn  tho  mono-
cultural Unitec  .S 1atc.c;- HhcrcaG  in fact  a  con.munity  of  !~tnles '"ith such 
diff~Jl'cnt hintoriN>,  h'aLlitions,  lnnr;uaGPD 1  culturcG  and  f;onrwn  of identity 
could  never conceivably  approxima  tc~  in  thin  rcr;pcc t  to  the  United  Stu  ten  of 
Amodeo.,  never  mind  go  beyond  that  coun".-J'Y  in  tlw  me.:wurc  of uniformity of 
Stntc:  economic  la1·:s. 
\/hat  is nt  innue  here  i.s  not  j\wt  the  concept o:  'Community  beer'  or  the 
'Community  loaf' 1  \-lhich  hrtve  in fact  be(;'n  nbar;cloned;  there  iu  also  the 
provifiion  desicncd  to  limit  nn  exte~sion of  zcro-rntinr; of  VAT,  and  the 
evident  intention  to  hnrmonir;oVAT_rat~s dcspit_c.thc  innpproprintcnoss of 
uniform  tax rntcn  in  n  Community  of  nuch diverse cultural  and  social diveroity. 
'l'hiu  approach conjures up  a  .::d.;Jd:mare  of  n  Community  in llhich for oxrunplo  taxation 
CJf  alcohol  would  hn  uniform,  dcspi  te  the evident  social  need  for levels of - 8-
countries and different  n.'l tional elastici  tic.s  of  demand  for  thin  product~ 
Another  general criticism of  the  Rome  Treaty,  which has  often been  made, 
Cfjpt'cially by  Socinlista,  is  that it appL~nrs  to  rely excessively,  and 
perhaps unrealistically,  on  liberal economic  theory.  The  concept of 
regulating economic  activity  throur.;h  the  competitive  process  runs  throughout 
the  Treaty,  even  in respect of areas  where  States whose  governments  though 
far  from socialist would not be  happy  to rely entirely on  this process and 
would  feel  the  need  for an  intervention by  the State  in  the  general social 
interest. 
Su~h an analysis  of what  neem  to  me  to be  the strengths and weaknesses  of  the 
Rome  Treaty is,  I  believe,  a  necessary exercise if we  are  to  plan a 
constructive  way  ahead  for  the  Community  in  the  period  up  until  the  end of 
the  present economic  recession  in Europe  - although of  course  the  foregoing 
comments  represent an entirely personal attempt at this.  \ve  must  be  clear-
£>ighted  about  the  deficH:ncies  of  the  Treaty,  seeking in  the  immed.ia te  future 
to  minimise  their impact  on  future  pr-ocrecw,  and  in  the  longer  term  to  prepare 
amendments  to  the  Treaty  whicn will provide  a  solid basis for progreso  during 
the  1980s. 
From  where  can  we  expect  the  impetus  to  cnmc:,  for further pror,ress  within  the 
framework  of  the  existing Treaty,  and  for an appropriate  amendment  of  the 
Treaty at a  later stage?  bne  could  visualise  a  number  of different sources 
of  dyn<imiam  both in  the  medium-term  and  in  the  longer  terln,  including,  (in 
tneo1y at leasU)  one  or  ·~0:--e-of  the  following1--
- the  emergence  of a  consensus  amongst  member  gove1•nments "as-to  1.he 
neFJd  to  make  rapid progress  toward.s  full  eccn.omic  integration; - 9  -
further measure5  of  economic  integration forced on  reluctan~ 
governments  by  the  urgent  need  to  secure  economic  coherence as 
between  member  ~tates; 
- an  impetus  coming  from  outside,  arising from  the  external relations 
of  the  Community  vlith other Staten; 
- or initiatives from  a  directly-elected parliament which  enjoys a 
sense of drawing its authority  from  the  peoples of Europe,  who  may 
be  further ahead  than governments  in  their willingness  to accept a 
fuller measure  of integration in  the  Community. 
The  experience  of  recent years  docs  not suggest  that governments  left to 
themselves are likely in  the  foreseeable  future  to become  a  major source 
of  European  dynamism.  While  the  governments  of certain countries  have 
retained a  sense  of commitment  towards  the  ultimate goal of  European Union, 
at any  given  time  there  are  liable  to be  individual  governments  unenthu~iastic 
aLout  changes  in  this direction.  'l'his  was  true  when  there  were  Gix  member 
States and,  inevitably- even if or~ly  ir. arithmetic  terms~  - this i£  10kely 
-
to  be  even  more  true  when  nine  governments  are  involved,  or possibly 10,  11 
or 12.  We  have  to  face  the  fact,  for  example,  that since  the  very  early 
days  of  the  Community  public  and political opinion  in ~ra.n_ce  have  tended  to 
be  sceptical about further  developments  in u  supra-national direction; 
thnt Britain,  an  important new  mf:mber,  oeems  to share  much  of  thio scepticism; 
und  that Germany,  in spite of  it.s  continuing comr.litment  to  a  greater mennure 
of  European  integration,  has  become  preoccupied with  domestic  economic 
stability and  the control  of  inflation  to an  extent  that its policies within 
the  Commurii ty  tend  iri  practice ·to  he~· somewhat  ner,a ti  ve  so  far as  the 
developm~nt of  new  policies  is concerned. 70  -
Of  course  thic.  picturt>  may  clvmge  in  tir..t•,  :c,J  thuu£:L  we  GboulJ  be  c) c:u.r·ly 
unwise  to sit back and  wait  for  the  rf:-.:;;r,:..:.· q~cncc of  the  lund of ei  tuation  that 
cxistP.d  in  Europe at a  certain star,e  in  the:  1950::;  when  in  nl.l  the  six member 
countries  there  were  government:>  r;tronrly  committed  to  European  economic  and 
political integration,  involvinc~ the  tran.:.fer of  some  important pmters  to 
supra-national  European  institutionso 
A potentially important  source  of  dynamism  for  the  Community  may  well prove 
to  be  the area of  economic  policy-making.  Whatever  illunions  may  have  existed 
in  the  late 1950s and  throughout  much  of  the  1960s  E1S  to  the  efficacy of 
freer  trade as  a  weapon  to secure  exchanec  rate stability, such  illusions have 
certainly been  shattered in  recent years.  It ic.  now  clear,  not alone  that  the 
degree  of  integration so far achieved is inadequate  to  ensure  a  measure  of 
exchnnr,e  rate stability between  member  States,  but  that  thir.  measure  of 
integration ia itself threatened by  the  abeencc  of such Gtability. 
To  some  degree  this reflec  t.s  the  failun:  af  t!le  l\orr.e  'l'reo. ty  to  P.nvisage  a 
sufficiently posi ti  Vt1  role  for  the  .::.:u.cop<:;Lr.  i r.t> ti  ttttlono  in  the  formulation 
and  evolution  of  economic  policie.s within  tht:  ComJilUi1ity.  But  the  problem is 
more  fundamental  than  this.  It is not jm;t tbt there  do.§-~  not exist a  policy-
mnkin1~ centre within  the  Community  capable  of  coordinating nntional economic 
policies - the  pr•oblem  is  that national  r;overnmc~nt.s  h~We  in Hidely  varyinp, 
de~reeo found it difficult to  implefficnt  anti-infllltionur~ policies especially 
in  the  face  of unrealistic public  pressures  to  cont:inue  the  process  of  improving 
real  living standards  in a  period of  nctunl economic  decline. 
In  the  face  of  the  economic  pressures  of  the  ·1 a:; t  fe1-1  year·.:•  the  national 
economic  policies of member  States have:  in  .f~ct  divi!rged  f\lUCh  more  markedly 
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I than at any  time  since  the  immed::.LJ.te  post-\1ar period.  Some  countries  have 
been able  to  control  inflationary pressures  fairly  tir,htly while  others have 
found  it impossible  to  do  so.  These  different outcomes  of what  is certainly 
a  common  wish  to control inflation derive  from  a  number  of  differences  between 
mt~mber .States  which  have  proved  more  important  than had been  perhaps  envisaged 
in earlier years.  These  include  differences  in  the stages of economic 
development of member  States,  which  quite  properly  re~uire the application of 
different economic  policies;  differences  in  the  degree  to which  member  States 
are  dependent  on  external  trade,  oscillations in  the  volume  and price elements 
of which  have  been de-stabilising factors  in  recent.years;  differences  in 
the  institutional structures of  member  States,  in particular in  the  trade 
union sector;  and  differences  in  the  historical experience  of member  countries 
so far as  inflation is concerned.  ~·lllf~re,  as  in  the  case  of Germany,  a  member 
State is well  favoured  in all four  respects,  it can achieve  without undue 
difficulty a  very  low  rate of  inflation indeed.  \-/here  on  the  other hand  a 
m~mber State  is less well  placed  in  respect  of  these  four aspects  of  the 
problem,  as  is  I  think  the  case  with  my  ovm  country,  the  rate of  inflation is 
liable  to be  very  much  higher. 
Divergences  in :inflation  rates,  vlhen  they  are  .J.s  mtJ.rY..ed  as  they  hc·we  be(!n  in 
rec<mt  times  under  the  pressure  of an  L:.nprecedented  world -recession,  have 
an  inevitable  impact  upon  exchancc  rate stability,  and  this  in  turn  can 
threaten  the  cohesion of  tr.e  Com~unity- most  obviously  that of  the  Common 
Agricultural Policy. 
In  this situation  the  emergence  of  a  common  Community  economic  policy is 
clearly fraught  wi tl'i  dH{icul  ty,  and  is scarcely likely  to  em~z:ge as a - 1;:  -
positive  dynamic  force  fCJ.vourin(';  economic  arHl  political integration unless 
a  number  of  preconditions are  met.  7hene  preconditions  would  necessarily 
include mutual assistance  on  an  extensive scale,  running beyond anything 
contemplated at present by  the  Community,  within which  the  scale of net 
transfers of resources  between  member  States have  hitherto been minuscule  by 
compariaon with what  would  be  required in order  to achieve  a  convergence  of 
national  economic  policies as  a  basis  for  a  Community  economic  policy. 
The  problems  in  this area  remain  immense  and  while  their solution is a  pre-
condition for  the  ultimate achievement  of  economic  and political integration 
we  cannot,  I  think,  expect  the  main  lead  to  come  from  this source  in  the 
foreseeable  future  although it is of vital importance  that some.  progress be 
~Ade in this area if the  general cohesion of  the  Community,  at 'the  stage it 
has  now  reached,  is not  to be  threatened. 
A  third possible source  of  imputus  towards  economic  and  political integration 
could bo  '"h£'  relationship between  the  Community  and  the  rest of  the  world. 
Certainly a  fair share  of  the  original  impetus  for  the  establishmeni of  the 
Community  came  from  this source,  as  European countries sought  to  recover 
a  measure  of  independence  of action and  control over their own  affairs in 
..... 
~ 
the  early post-War period when  they  found  themselves  for  the first  time  in a 
world  domina ted by  two  super powers.  The  pressures  of  those years no  longer  ., 
exist on  the  same  scale,  however,  and  to  the  extent  that  they  do  exist  they 
seem  to exert a  less powerful attraction  to  the  imaginations  of Community 
citizens. 
On  the  other hand  one  cannot fail  to be  struck by  the  cont.;r:aet: between  the 
immense  power  of attraction which  tho  Community  as an  economic  unit exerts 
\ 
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in world  trod(>,  and  the  internal weaknesses  of  the  Community  aa  we  see it 
from  inside.  At  certain periods,  moreover,  the  Community  hns  ohown  itself 
to be  a  potent  force  for  pro~ress in world  economic  development.  This  was 
true,  for  example,  of  the  years  1974  and  1975  when  the  Community  took  the  lead 
in seeking  to avoid  confrontation with  the  countries of  the  Third World  and 
I 
: 
to establioh n  negotiating structure  between  the  industrialised and developing 
countries.  In  the  aftermath of  the  ur~C'l'AD  Conference at Nairobi,  and  with  tho 
Paris CIEC  Conference  stalemated,  the  Community  has  lost much  of  what it had 
in  this way  gained  in world  respect and prestige  in  the  two  preceding years  -
but the  loss is not  irretrievable,  and  one  should not discount  the  potential 
ability of  the  Community  to play such a  positive role again in  the  future. 
Nevertheless,  the  Community  is a  lon~ way  from  the  stage at which its role 
in world affairs would  become  a  source  of serious presnure  on it to achieve 
a  greater degree  of  economic  and  political cohenion,  although  one  can  expect 
some  pressure  to  come  from  this source  in  the years ahead. 
For  many  p("ople  the  brightest prospect at present for a  new  break-through seema 
to be  offered by  the  European  Parlia~ent, because  of  the  expectation  th~t when 
such a  Parliament  is directly elected,  it will begin  to assert itnelf in a 
~::..""  ~ 
manner  analop;oun  to  that  in which national Parliaments  in member  countries 
have  at various  times  in  the  past au.serted  tLemselves,  vis-~-vis the  executi,ve 
power  in  their  f~tates.  It would  probably  be  unwise,  however,  to count  on  this 
process  operatinp; very  rapidly,  in  tho  immediate  aftermath of  the  first direct 
election.  Indeed  in  the  short run at least direct elections may  modify  in 
Borne  degree·the  'European1oricntution of  the  existinp; Parliament,  whose 
membership at present,  because  of  the  manner  in which  it~ representatives are 
Belected by  their national parliaments,  may  be  drawn  in disproportionate measure  from  nmonr;s t  nn tional  parlh>.rn<!n t.c<J·iuns  ~ \:o  ure  on  nv11rarl'  more 
'European'  in  their r;enoral  orit'ntaLon  1.h:~n  Uwir  coll•mf~l1l:C.  who  remain 
solely  involved  in  tbnir natio:ial  iJarl.i.:lment~;.  It in certain,  moreover, 
that  there  will be  renistnnce  from  Borne  quarters  to  an  early extension  to 
the  legislative  power::;  of parliament;  It har>  ~;ven been  sugr;ected  by  some 
that it might  be  derd rnblc  t.h~  t  trw  direc tly-clected Parliament  should~ 
be  too  closely proportiunr.tlly  reprer;en  b  ti  ve  of  member  .Stu tea lest such 
proportionality micht  incre<••'le  itR  belief in ita own  right  to participate 
fully in  the  legislative  process  in  the  CommunityL 
tlevertheless,  havinr entered  those  cav8a  h;  it remnina  true,  I  believe,  that 
in  the  fore1;eeahle  future,  prcnsu rc  from  th:i.s  source  may  prove  relatively 
effective  in at least muintaininr;  the·  momentum  of  the  development  of  the 
Community,  and  over  a  tH1r.W\·Iha t  lon1~er  time-scale  could  p:rove  a  mnjor  dynamic 
force. 
vlhat  emerges  from  this brief  ~malyDi.s  i;;  that  there  in  no clenr or simple  way 
by  whi\.'h  tt-"  Community  will recove:t  Hn  dynalllism  in  the  period  imrnedia tely 
ahead;  tht>.r'e  ic.  no  panacea.  I:u:;ter~d  a  complex  i:r.tHr-uction of different 
forces,  each  pl~yin~ some  purt  in  the  proc0sc,  i~ likely  to  create  changes 
in  attitud~s,  r~ssihly fairly  imp0rcop~ihly, and  poanibly  over n  period of  a 
-~· 
number  of yc>nrc.  1/h~:lt  one  l;ji{~ht  hop(!  t;r.  bet}  lllightbe a cituation in which 
nome  pressure  wiJ l  r:'.1ille  on  the:  Cw"rr.uni Ly  fl·o~l  a  }J0.rception  of  the  importance 
of  the  rnle  it mir:ht  play  in  IHl~J~.~  ~:c0nowie nffnb·s if it could achieve  a 
greater measur2  of  policy  coherence;  n  UJavrment  towardG  ~renter internal 
economic  coh~renco would  take  place  under  the  presAure  of  the  threat of 
dir.integre~tion po,;e<i  by  ::he  f:d.luro  to  achieve  such  p~·ogress;  while at  the 
Aame  time  dir~:ct  ..;lect~or~t;  tu  a  :·: ... r-opcrm  Parliament,  and  t..hR"  ."Jventtml  renction 
.........  ,.'1i!C;_.:;- :..:.:-,..----------- ~---·· ___ ,..:.;.;;:.:..,.._::  .... !,.·.:.- • .,.  .. ~ ••  :=. ...  :;,-': ..  ~;;.....,;..~~,  ..  ,..""'  ...........  _  .•  _,..  6,.,,.-;-,l  .·;·--~.-.  ... __  _..._ 
---~~....__...,_=-=--~--- .. - ..  -.  -~_,,..  ....  ,.;--of that Parliament  to  the  n~:w authority it would  thus  secure,  mivht  put  the 
other institutions,  and  above all the  Council of  Ministers,  under  pressure 
gradually  to accept changes  in  the  institutional relationships which  would 
provide  a  firmer baois  for further progress.  The  inter-action between 
different developments  of  this kind  could  then,  over a  period of years,  put 
pressure  on  governments  to adopt  a  more  positive approach  towards  further 
economic  and political integration. 
This  is unlikely  to  happen,  however,  unless  public  opinion  in  member  States 
demands  such a  development  and  this  in  turn  can only  come  about if public 
opinion  regains  confidence  in  the  potential of  the  Community  to serve  the 
interests of  the  peoples  of  Europe.  And  such a  development  in public  opinion 
itself depends  upon  a  measure  of progress being achieved and  perhaps 
especially upon  the  impact of direct elections  on  public opinion  in member 
States. 
The  prospect  then  for  the  years  ahead  io,  hopefully,  one  of a  complex  inter-
play of  forces, .undramatic  in character,  which over a  period of a  number  of 
years  could  modify significantly,  but  perhaps  very  gradually,  the  ~:-3ent 
negative attitudes  towards  further economic  and  political integration.  At  some 
point  in  time  these  developments  could  require  a  fairly radical  review  of  the 
Rome  Treaty so  that,  perhaps  by  its  ~Oth birthday,  i~~~ig~t be  adapted  to  the 
needs  of  the  closing years of  the  century. 
It would  then  be  for a  new  generation of  politicians  to build on  this  framework, 
poaaibly by  the  end  of  the  century,  a  Lnited States of  Europe  that would  provide 
ita member  countrieo with  the  two  tiers of  GGVernment  - sub-continental and - 16  -
national  - that would  be  nececsury  for 
1.-iestern  Europe  to play  an  effective 
role  thereufter. 
It is not  too soon  for us  to  begin  to  consider,  more  seriously  than  we  have 
hitherto,  just what kinds  of  decision  could  most appropriately be  taken at a 
European level in such a  structure of  government,  and what  kinds  of  decision 
must  remain at the  level of  the  national governments,  whose  essential role, 
above all as  the  guardians  of  the  cultural identities of their peoples,  will 
survive  indefinitely. 
The  decision-making balance  between  these  two  tiers will not  be  the  same  as 
in existing federations  which are  broadly speaking mono-cultural  in  character, 
e.g.  the  Federal Republic  of Germany,  the  United Staten of  America,  the 
Commonwealth  of Australia,  etc.  For  in  those  .Sta tea  it is at  the  hir;her level 
of government  that  the  function  of  prenerving  the  cultural  identity of  the 
nation  is exercised,  in addition  to  the  crucial economic  decision-making and 
resource-a:·l.:..:&":.i0n  functions.  In  tho  United States of  Europe  of  the  future 
the  building blocks  of  the  nation States will retain much  more  of their 
present  roles,  especially  in  the  social and cultural areas,  devolving upwards 
only  those  economic  and political functions  which could no  longer,  in  the 
world of  the  21st century,  be  exercised effectively at the  nation-State level. 
That  is  w}cy  uny  anAlocy  between  the  political structure  we  are  endeavouring  to 
cr~a  te  in  Europe  and  federul  struc  tun•s  that already exist in  the  world,  is 
inherently  defective~  'l'he  .Guropcan  experiment  is sui  gencris;  it has  no 
precedents  to  go  on;  it is  thcrofore_a  unique~y complex  and  difficult 
experiment and  one  vthic:h  co:nmon  Dense  tella  us  could not concei  trably  reach ita 
full  fruition  in less  than  hal:'  a  century  from  ito initiation,  given  the unique  character of  what  i.:.  being attempted.  Perhaps  the  founders  of  the 
Community .thought  that their objectives could be  achieved  in a  shorter time. 
If so  they  were  wrong;  they  made  in.:.dequate  allowance  for  the  magnitude  of 
the  task  they  were  undertal<ine and for  the  extreme  difficulty involved  in 
creating a  completely  new  type  of political unit in world society.  In  the 
perspective of history,  half a  century  - much  less  than  the  time-span of an 
average  human  life - is a  relatively short space  of  time  for  the  nccompliohment 
of  the  task which  the  inspired founders  of  the  Community  set themselves  in 
the  grim aftermath of  the  .Gecond  v/orld  vJar. 
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